Tenets, 17 November 1994, part 2

Yeah. Yeah. We’re gonna do it. Yeah. Is that getting well?

If it’s not going well then it’s understandable because here because here, the discussion and explanation concerns the way to prove emptiness in accordance with the highest Buddhist tenet, the middle way. So if one has not heard many times in the past, then it might not click well. The other middle way proponent which is the higher middle way proponent in state is called by the name consequentialist or consequentialist and the reason for it is is because firstly it asserts that there isn’t any phenomena which exist inherently or truly and then in order to establish the non true existence about phenomena this tenet says there is no need to apply reasoning in the sense independent existing reasoning it instead affirms that the non true existence about phenomena can be can be realized or understood by way of implied errors by way of implications if the things were otherwise so in the implied reasoning or consequentialist reasoning what it what’s the thrust of the absurd would itself be the way to prove the non true existence of our phenomena. So what does thrust reasoning actually means is it is way of implying or putting the thrust, the implication backward which if we are to look for example and then try to relate in more understandable way then we might say the example of things happening in the monasteries where when the monks gather in the gathering hall for their sessions then there could be some naughty ones who might gossip so much amongst themselves so they talk and talk around.

And then there is a supervisor, the word actually wasn’t named but just used the disciplinarian. So there is a supervisor, a disciplinarian monk who when observes that there are some chattering around going on, then the disciplinarian, instead of saying, don’t talk or gossip, says, keep talking. It says, keep talking. I will see you later. So there so there is a thrust, the implication, which actually is don’t talk, otherwise, be punished.

So that is the thrust, the implication. So I wasn’t playing what’s called playing or acting. It was how it was. What happens is let’s look at another example. Say, your opponent Now let’s look at another example say in the case of opponent in a dialectical inquiry.

If the opponent comes up with the assertion or theory saying the bell or vase over there is a permanent phenomenon from on the one side as well the opponent asserts that the bell vase object is as well produced by its causes. So if let’s say the other person the opponent comes up with these two theory or assertion at the same time then we can say there is two contradictory assertion on the one hand the the person asserts the thing is permanent. On the other hand, the person asserts that it is yet produced by its cause, a product. It is a product. Therefore, the opponent has these two contradictory assertion.

Now from one side, one of course in the right correct perspective from this side who has the correct perspective does see that on one hand there is a correct understanding by the opponent that the bell vase of the object is produced by its causes and more precisely by its conditions as well but from here one has to be skillful to not negate in one’s response to the person that fact about the object that it is produced by causes and conditions but at the same time one wish to let the opponent know that it is not a permanent phenomenon so it has to be a reasoning of implication where one is negated at the same time the other is still retained the correct understanding. So the correct perspective person from here presents to the implication back to the opponent saying this object meaning here the bell vase this object is not produced by causes and condition because it is permanent which in brackets might say as you assert it. So when that is said to the opponent that this object is not produced by causes and condition because it is permanent then it brings a doubt in the opponent’s mind thinking well if it is if it is produced by causes condition which I can accept then it cannot be permanent phenomena because permanent phenomena cannot produce things now the very fact the other person is putting the thrust back is implying that it is produced by causes a condition of which I can very well see so then there is the doubt about whether it actually is impermanent or permanent phenomenon or not on the part of the opponent so that ‘s why the thrust, the implication is cast back to the opponent.

Therefore, one needs to negate permanence about the object, the bell vase here on the table, the bell vase. So one then puts the thrust back to the opponent saying the bell or vase object this is not produced by its causes and conditions because it is permanent. So when that is put forth back then the opponent in this case who actually asserted the two theories at the same time then there is a trigger in the mind of the opponent thinking it is definitely produced by causes and condition but if it is produced by causes and condition then it cannot be permanent so the opponent then by way of putting a dramat dramatized scene we might say then hangs there with hat looking upward and then in the mind going through the whole question is it really permanent or not it can be permanent if it is produced by causes condition so eventually by that way the opponent then realizes that this cannot definitely be permanent because it is produced by causes and conditions. So that is how exactly the thrust thrown back to the opponent, the erroneous thrust put back establishes the fact about the thing. So in this way, this is exactly what the consequentialist middle way tenet maintains that through thrust reasoning the other side’s misunderstanding can be negated and by that way the actual non true existence about phenomena can be established.

Another example with the same bell vase, the object here on the table, the bell vase, let’s say if the other side maintains on the one hand the thing is produced by its causes and conditions and at the same time as well maintains it truly exists. Then from the part of the Prāsaṇgika middle way the thrust put back to the person is this object is not truly existent because it is produced by causes and conditions. When this is put back to the person the thrust then the person wonders it is definitely produced by causes and conditions it is produced observably if it is then it can’t be truly existent something truly independently solidly existing like that. So when the person starts to wonder then it leads to thinking the otherwise and then finally comes to the awareness if it is produced by causes and conditions then it cannot be truly existent. So it is not truly existent and that’s exactly again to repeat the consequentialist presents its reasoning.

Yeah. So this thrust reasoning is presented by those who are wise as well as presented to those who are wise themselves, the opponent to being wise. Because when the consequentialist reasoning the implication is put back to the person then the person being wise from its side too start thinking about it and then comes to the realization about the inner contradiction of the person’s own assertions. So in that way the person thinks about it and then finally comes to realize the otherwise and in that way we can say it has to be presented to someone who is wise enough to think about it. Otherwise, in the case of those who are not wise, they wouldn’t bother to think about it.

In your case, definitely, you would have become wise because you have done your study on the specific schools, the Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrantikas, then you have afterwards studied as well on the Cittamātrins, and then you have as well studied on mind only. You you are presently arrived at the middle way proponents. Oh, in that way, that is how the name Svatāntrika and consequentialist come to be called. Now we come to the third outline which is the specific details on the two divisions of which which we first look at the first middle way proponent which is the lower middle way proponent the Svatāntrika and this is then where we look more detail in specific about what this tenet particularly asserts and its practice and theory so forth and regarding that in that topic we break into seven subdivisions of topics similar exactly as previous other tenets starting from name or definition division etymological explanation the assertion about object about subject about path and so forth. So not spelled out exactly same as the other three tenets, our previous ones.

The definition of the Svatāntrika middle way is it goes this way the middle way proponent who accepts non true existence by way of our own reasoning. The middle the middle way proponent who accepts non true existence by way of own reasoning. Svatāntrika Middle Way is also called by another name which goes this way. The middle way proponent who asserts the existence of phenomena from their own characteristics. So that’s another name and what that means is the Svatāntrika middle way or tenet this lower middle way tenet asserts that phenomena do exist from their own side.

And that’s why it got this name, the middle way proponent asserting phenomena existing from their own characteristics. In any rate, the two names mean the same. The following the Sautrāntika resemblance and the other Svatāntrika middle way following Yogachara or in other words, similar to mind only. The Middle Way, Svatāntrika Middle Way, which follows discourse group resemblance. So in meaning is that subtenant of the Svatāntrika middle way who asserts some theories similar to the second lowest Buddhist tenet, the Sautrantikas.

The reason why this subtenant is called the Svatāntrika middle way tenet following the Sautrāntika resemblance is because if we can remember during our discussion on the Sautrāntika theory we found that that tenet accepts externally actually existing phenomena or in another word solid matter existing there but it does not accept self-knower, self-knower, it does not accept a consciousness knowing itself so termed scripturally as self-knower. Like that here this particular sub tenet of the Svatāntrika middle way tenet asserts in similar way that there is externally actually existing phenomena yet at the same time on this does not accept the theory of self-knowing consciousness. The theory which asserts externally actually existing phenomena maintains firstly the building unit of a gross mass is tiny partless particle. Many of these partless particles gather together becoming bigger and bigger and finally there comes about visible gross mass. Instead, might clarify by saying that this specific subtenant of own reason middle way is given the resemblance to discourse group only from the standpoint of their resemblance of the theory about externally actually existing phenomena because though this middle way the own reason middle way tenant following the Sautrāntika resemblance does not accept self-knower but in the case of the Sautrāntika it can be said that they do not accept self-knower.

So as far as the resemblance of the two tenet goes, it’s only on the point of the external actually existing phenomena. And then here the second sub tenet of this own reason middle way is called the own reason middle way following Yogachara or the union practice in the sense, but like the Yogachara, nothing to do with esoteric nothing to do with esoteric in this case and why it is called by that name is firstly Yogacarya in this case in meaning refers to mind only and this particular middle way sub tenet resembles the theory of mind only as far as where the mind only tenet does not accept externally actually existing phenomena but accepts a theory of consciousness knowing itself a self-knower like that in this present sub-tenet of the Svatāntrika middle way it equally says that there is not externally actually existing phenomena and on top of that here too this present sub-tenet accepts a consciousness knowing itself, the so-called self-knower. But in that self-knower. Oh, yeah.

So, anyway, we shall stop here for tonight. And if you have any questions, we put it, yeah, some minutes for that. So self-knower instead of non-knower. Sorry. Omni-knower.

Yep. You can relate Zag che Nyima according in correspondence to the four tenets according to the Prāsaṇgika because of the Cittamātra parts relate to the view, the emptiness aspect, and more so in accordance with the understanding of the Prāsaṇgika, the consequentialist They would not accept them as truly existent. One with regards to the external and actually existing, the other with regard to the self-knower. Because already as we went ahead with the definition of the middle proponent we came across the great vehicle proponent who does not even normally accept true existence so oh yep it would mean that there isn’t even a particle of phenomena existing truly. The example of mottled rope appearing as snake is considered more an exclusive example of consequentialist.

And then the example of magician producing illusory horses and elephants is considered more very effective for own reasoning theory. Although we can say although we can say there are cases in times when that example as well is applied by the trust reasoners. Because in the case of the magician producing illusory spectacle, how the example fits very well to the own reason in middle way it’s because the spectators from their side due to their eyes tainted by a spell charm projects onto the illusion as if there actually are truly existing horses and elephants to be there to be found but at the same time from the part of the charmed stick and the pebbles there must be some portion of reality to appear as horses and elephants. Therefore that combined projection and some label or portion of true existence from the part of the things fits very well with the own reasoning middle way of saying that things truly exist or things externally exist from their side. Example of motley rope appearing as a snake coil is considered the very effective in going hand in hand with the consequentialist theory because in the case of the mottled-colored rope it is totally projection from the part of the person that there seems to be snake there whereas from the part of the motley rope there isn’t slightest bit of a snake to be existing or to be found at all.

Like that the Prāsaṇgika maintains the assertion that all phenomena exist in the fashion of mere appearance. And from their part, don’t exist at all. Yeah. Thank you for your question. Very good one.

Good. Oh, yeah. Thank you.