Mind Training, 16 September 1997, part 2

So likewise, we can take as as an example our own bodies that the body our bodies do not truly exist. They do not they are not inherently existent, intrinsically existent. That they are not established from their own side. But on the contrary, as we can readily understand, that our body has arisen in dependence upon causes and conditions. That, for example, our parents, the sperm of our father, the ovum of our mother, it arises in dependence upon flesh and blood, upon channels and wind energies.

That if the body were truly existent, it would rely upon nothing outside of itself. It would rely upon it would not depend upon anything outside of itself for its existence. It would not depend upon the sperm of the father or the ovum of the mother. It would not depend upon flesh or blood or bones. That it would be inherently existent.

It would not depend its existence would not rely upon the sperm or the ovum or the flesh or the bones. It would exist within itself from its own side. But we can understand that it does not exist this way. It only relatively exists. Its existence is reliant upon factors other than itself.

This is the way that we can proceed on meditating on emptiness. Yes? So, first, in English, the other words that we can use are designate or label or impute or posit label maybe, but In brief, saying that the thought this this is a flower, this is a table, this is a cup, this is this is to think that this is a glass, this is the thinking that is is is what we mean by impute. If I heard correctly, it was said that the mind that imputes snake to a coiled rope and I and the I that arises when one is called a thief is the same same type of mistaken consciousness. Is that mistaken conscious, are they the same because they are mistaken awarenesses?

Or are they also the same because of the sort of emotional charge that accompanies both in the case of the snake and the coiled rope, fear arose, which was aversion in the case of being called a thief, a sort of attachment about the the the self arose, and so if, for example, one were to see the coiled rope and just say, snake, no big deal. Neutral could care less. Would it be the same as the I that arises when one is called a thief? So they’re similar in that they’re both mistaken consciousnesses. One upon observing a rope, one conceives snake, one is merely imputing a snake, thinking this is a snake and that is a mistaken consciousness.

And like, then in the example in terms of the I, first one is simply one calls your name and the thought arises, I am being called. This is a factual awareness. That’s non mistaken awareness. But when we’re called a thief and one conceives as I am not a thief, the I in such a context appears to exist independent of everything else and the mind grasps to this appearance. And this is mistaken awareness since the eye, in fact, does not does depend upon the aggregates, but it appears not to.

The mind is conceiving that it doesn’t exist upon in dependence upon the aggregates, and therefore it is a mistaken consciousness. So in those two, both the conception of a rope as a snake and the conception of an independently existing I, they are similar in being both mistaken consciousnesses. So if we take those two examples and look at them from the side of the object, there is nothing whatsoever in terms of from the side of the object that is a snake. Either its parts or the collection of the parts which is the snake. And likewise there is nothing about the aggregates, either their collection or their parts or their collection which is an independently existing I.

Yes? One thinks I’m being called. It was never said that you thought your aggregates were being called. It was said that you think I’m being called. So what is your question?

So why is that a non mistaken consciousness? I see. Okay. So the main purpose is a main sort of a main banner. So I’ll just say this first then if you want to go on, we can go on.

When someone calls your name and you think I’m being called, what appears to you is the conventionally existent I, the I which is merely imputed to the aggregates. That’s what appearing to you. And the I which, and the conception of this I is a factually concordant awareness. That I in fact exists, one conceives of it to exist, and it does exist. And then one goes on to misconceive this I to independently exist, then it becomes a mistaken consciousness.

Do so I don’t know if that answers your question or not. In the Heart Sūtra, this discourse that we recite at the beginning of each teaching, says that, for example, it says there is no form, no feeling, no recognition, there is no eye, no ear. It goes on to list all these various phenomena and it says they do not exist. It is not the fact that they do not exist. What is to be understood is that there is no inherently existent form.

There is no inherently existent I. There is no inherently existent nose. Enumerating all of these phenomena qualifying them to understand that they do not inherently exist would be a useful way to proceed in meditation on emptiness. Okay. Thank you.

Thank you.