Session 22 of 40 - Entering the Middle Way

Entering the Middle Way, 30 May 1991, part 2

30 May 1991 - 46 min KR-0016.23

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Transcript: Corrected Transcript generated by speech recognition and AI correction; may contain errors.

If we were to question, well, how does the first reason bring about an understanding of emptiness? So understanding the empty by means of the first reason. The first reason, we are making analysis of the entity of the sprout itself. And what do we mean by empty? It is that the sprout, that is the entity of the sprout, is empty of natural existence, is empty of true existence, is empty of inherent existence.

Thing. Or another way of saying that is that there is, with respect to the entity, is a non existence of natural existence, non existence of true existence, the non existence of inherent existence. Empty and non existent are simply two ways of saying the same thing. So, to put this, to set this reasoning out, we are taking as our subject the entity of the sprout, and we are seeking to establish that the sprout is not truly existent, or not inherently existent. And the reason that we state is that the entity of the sprout is not truly existent because it is neither existently one, or truly existently many.

Being neither truly existently one, nor truly existently many, it cannot be truly existent at all. Synonyms for these terms are one, identical, same, many, different. So if we were to set set this forth in a syllogism. The subject being sprout, predicate that is not truly existent, Because it is neither truly existently one nor truly existently many. So in dependence upon this line of reasoning, we can establish that the entity is empty.

And if we reflect upon this reasoning and make use of it in our meditation, we will come to understand that the entity of the sprout is empty of being truly existent. Therefore, we will have realized empty. Through this reasoning, we will come to understand what is meant by empty. Beggar had money, a beggar doesn’t have any money. They have neither one coin or many coins.

If a beggar had money, they would have to have either one coin or more than one coin. They must have one of these two. They would either have to have one coin or more than one coin, many coins. Yes. But if, in fact, the beggar doesn’t even have one coin, then not having one coin refutes the possibility of having many coins.

Why doesn’t the beggar have many coins? Because the beggar doesn’t have one coin. Applying this to the sprout. The entity of the sprout itself is neither truly existently one nor truly existently many. It is not truly existently many because it’s not truly existently one.

It’s not a truly existent multiplicity because it’s not a truly existent singularity. Singularity. If not even a single truly existing, how can it be a multiplicity of truly existent? All phenomena must be either one or many. Nothing which exists can go beyond being one or many.

If it’s not a truly existing singularity, how can it be a truly existing multiplicity? Therefore, it’s not truly existent. The, the, the sprout is not truly existently many because it’s not truly existently one. Why is it not truly existently one? Because of the reason that it has parts.

If in order for something to be truly existently one, that is a truly existently singularity, it cannot have parts. It must exist independent of parts. It has to exist independent of everything else. But in fact, the sprout is reliant upon other. It is reliant upon its parts.

For example, it has parts in that it has various directional parts, and in reliance upon this, it is constituted out of relying upon its parts. Therefore, it cannot be a truly existent singularity. So there’s a great deal to reflect upon in this line of reasoning in terms of why the sprout is neither true to exist in many, nor one, in terms of it not being one nor and because it has parts. in dependence upon this line of reasoning cultivated in meditation, one one will come to understand empty. And through cultivating in meditation, the line of reasoning, the second line of reasoning, one will come to understand peace.

So the second line of reasoning is the reasoning of the diamond slivers, and this is one of the main modes of reasoning which Nāgārjuna makes use of in settling the meaning of emptiness. And in turn, Candrakīrti, in his text Entering the Middle Way makes use of it mainly in terms of coming to an understanding of the selflessness of phenomena. So, this second line of reasoning has its source in the verse which was previously from Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Fundamental Wisdom in which it said, Self, other, both, and no cause. No phenomena whatsoever is produced by any of these means. So so we have a lesson in grammar.

There’s a what is actually being translated when we say truly existent, There is two words. So there’s a grammatical particle between the word true and existent. So true existent, the truth exists. For example, there’s conventional truth, there’s ultimate truth. So we’re not talking about that the truth does not exist.

There’s a grammatical particle here which more properly exists as true. It’s more proper to translate this term as established as true or existing as true, the as, or truly established or truly existent. We can’t just say true existence. We have to say truly existent because the truth exists, conventional truth and ultimate truth. But there is nothing which is truly existent or exists as true or is established as truth, established as truth, exists as truth, I think.

So you have to understand the grammar. So there’s a difference. We say true existence, what we mean is existing as true. True existence, when we say true existence, we mean existing, what we mean is truly existing, truly existing. We don’t mean that truth exists.

We’re not saying the truth does not exist or the truth is not established. The truth is established. The truth is established or truth does exist, but it does not truly exist, or truth is not truly established. So, we present this reasoning in the form of syllogism. We take as our subject to sprout, and the predicate, it does not truly exist because it is produced by neither self, other, both, or causelessly.

It is not produced either by itself, other, both, or causelessly. So the sprout is produced from a cause, but what kind of cause? That’s what we’re analyzing, the nature of the cause which produces the sprout. Okay. Mistranslated the name of this reasoning.

I said Diamond Slivers. I think it’s usually translated that, but it doesn’t fit. The Can you hear me? Yeah. But I think it may be the Vajra prongs reasoning.

Vajra prongs rather than diamond slivers. And so in India there was a particular worldly deity, Indra, an extremely powerful worldly deity, who holds a vajra which has four prongs. And just as a is, we say that, for example, the vajra can overcome forces. It has the power of destroying, but in turn the Vajra as a whole has the ability, but each of the prongs, each of these four prongs has that same ability to overcome the discordant, able to destroy. So, this reasoning of the four pronged Vajra has the ability to refute production from self, production from other, production from both, and production causelessly.

So this reasoning is analogous to this four prong Vajra. So the entering the text goes into great detail on this four prong Vajra reasoning, and it’s one of the main reasonings set forth. We’re going to go into the explanation in a detailed fashion. So we’re not going into it anymore this evening if you have any questions. So as the text entering goes into sets forth these four four prong Vajra set of reasonings in the same manner as is set forth in the Treatise on the Fundamental Wisdom going into the actual refutation of each of the four prongs, production from other, refutation of production from self, production from other, both, and causeless production.

So if one were going to become a So if one is if one when one is preparing to become a Geshe, then one must train very well in this four pronged logic reasoning. Likewise, if one wants to realize emptiness, one has to train well in these reasonings. So, your question? Yes? The the these are five modes of reasoning.

Yes. Five correct signs. But surely, the the first one, I mean, the syllogism makes makes sense only if it’s if it’s premise If it’s premise. The premise Could you put in that the form of a question? Is that so?

Is what so? So, there there’s a there’s a Well, there are the five is the premise of the syllogism by which we’ve been told that the first of the first of the modes of reasoning bears truth, not that of the fifth mode of reasoning, dependent arising. Because the syllogism was it had the subject to sprout and the predicate of not true of being truly existent or not truly existent. And then it went on to say that the mode of reasoning was by the one or many. The syllogism was it what?

I forget how you put it. But it but it started off by The sprout is neither truly existent because it’s neither truly existent in one or truly existent So so the proof of it is not being truly existent is one. I see. So there are some who in establishing that the sprout is not truly existing in one because it’s not truly existing in the one it has There are some who establish that it is truly existent in one in dependence upon the fact that it’s a dependent arising, and others who simply rely upon because it has parts. Isn’t that having parts the center of dependent arising?

There is a difference in degree of difficulty in realization between those two, having parts and dependent arising. A difference in degree and difficulty of realization. So having realized that it has parts in understanding that reasoning, then one can go on to understand it’s the dependent arising. So, one develops the first two valid cognitions with respect to these first two ways of reasoning and then goes on to verify the third way of analysis.

So we develop a conviction of inference by coming to understand that what is mainly being taught by the Buddha, that being the attainment of liberation and omniscience is incontrovertible. The statements which are being made use of in teaching the means for the attainment of liberation and omniscience are incontrovertible in that we cannot, through a process of reasoning, find any faults with them and that therefore they are valid. Then having ascertained that the main teaching setting forth the main objects of striving, which the Buddha taught, are valid, then we can gain conviction that those other teachings which is set forth are also valid. For example, that through ethics we can in the future attain a happy migration, and dependence upon generosity we will have objects of enjoyment. That if the main teaching, if the main object of attainment being taught is found to be valid, that it cannot be controverted, then which, then those other teachings, we can have conviction that they are also true.

Why? Because it’s talking about it’s talking about taking one conviction and transferring it onto another teaching. And and it seems to it seems, in fact, to contradict what the Buddha was saying. Buddha So, in terms of the inference by means of conviction, what is meant is if the central teachings of Buddha are valid, having been established through reasoning that no fault can be found in them, then those lesser types of teachings, that is to say, teachings which have less significance and which are difficult to realize, can be accepted out of conviction if the central teachings and those which have greater meaning are found to be valid. But even those which are not central teachings, we still don’t accept those just on face value.

They still must satisfy the first two modes of analysis. So though they are difficult to realize, they must at least satisfy the first two modes of analysis and then having gained conviction in the teachings since the central teachings are valid, ascertained through reasoning, then those lesser teachings, which are not as significant but are difficult to understand, can be accepted, we can gain a conviction as to these lesser teachings. So, if in fact the teachings were seen to be in error, that faults could be found in them, other teachings, if the central teachings could be found to have fault and to be in error, then we could suppose that the other teachings, which we could not directly establish, we could dismiss them as being valid, simply as a consequence of seeing that the central teachings are invalid. But if in fact by applying these three modes of analysis, we establish that the central teachings are in fact valid, that we cannot controvert them, we cannot find fault, then we can only establish in terms of the coarse level. Though we cannot understand the overall teachings at the coarse level of the teachings, we cannot find any fault.

Those very subtle types of teachings, such as ethics bringing happiness in the future, Though we can have conviction that these are also valid since the other, the central teachings, have been found to be valid. Could say trust. Trust? You can trust those. Maybe that’s better.

Trust. You can if the essential minor teachings can be trusted. Isn’t isn’t, like, actual fact more subtle than the connection? What do you mean? Of conventionality like inference of fact and conviction.

Seems like fact is is more subtle than From what point of view are more subtle? For example, the inference which understands the thesis sound as a subject, it is impermanent because it is a product. It is an inference by means of evidence or the fact. That’s not very But on the other hand, when we say that through ethics, that we have attained our present body through the observance of ethics, and we say, Well, when was that ethics observed? Where was it observed?

This is extremely subtle. This is extremely difficult to understand. So, in order to have an inference with respect to these qualities of ethics, and we have to have an inference of conviction, or an inference of maybe trust is better. Isn’t this more subtle, these understandings? One in translation is inference by way of cogent evidence, or inference by way of the fact?

By way of the fact, by way of the cogent evidence of the fact? [The first one is, there should be no fault found by the right cognition.] No fault found by inference of the fact, or inference of of cogent evidence. Who established those three? If the Buddha established the line of going through it all, who established the the three checklist? Buddha established the line of going through it all.

Yeah. But if if it was Buddha who said, look, don’t don’t believe my teachings just because you think I’m a really nice guy or because you think you can trust me, he came up with the three checklist. There.

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